"The Court did not address the statute from a constitutional
perspective, it implicitly assumed the constitutionality
of the 'in commerce' requirement."
"Covered jurisdictions are not now engaged in a systematic campaign to deny black citizens access to the ballot through intimidation and violence." ~Justice Clarence Thomas
"Take a strong stand and uphold the true heart of your agreement with honesty and no playing with the words. Monitor your agreement and keep an open mind for the right solution to all situations. Don't give too much because your jurisdiction is precious." Give too much and you will lose it one way by showing that your incompetent or the other way that your not cooperating. There is two sides, walk in the middle." ~~Twila WhiteBear
Here’s a hypo: assume a defendant hires a Las Vegas killer to murder the defendant’s wife in Reno, but the defendant never knows how the hitman plans to travel. If the hitman drives straight north on I-95 through Death Valley (staying in Nevada), the defendant is guilty, if at all, of some state offense only.
If the hitman gets a cheap Southwest flight from Vegas to San Francisco, though, and then drives a rental car to Reno – then the defendant has committed a federal crime. The defendant must induce the hitman to travel to murder, and (whether known to the defendant or not) the murderer must travel interstate, to satisfy the federal statute.
The was the law, and had always been the law...until our case.
U.S. v. Alderman, No. 07-30186 (5-12-09). The 9th holds that the sale of body armor in interstate commerce creates a sufficient nexus between possessing the body armor and commerce to allow for congressional commerce clause authority. The majority (McKeown joined by B. Fletcher) feel that they have to follow the Supremes precedent in Scarborough v. U.S., 31 US 563 (1977) (firearm that travels interstate provides nexus) and 9th Circuit precedent in U.S. v. Cortes, 299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002). The majority acknowledges the tension in the changing commerce clause jurisprudence, citing Morrison and Lopez. However, the statute closely tracks the one in Scarborough, and that the requirement that the body armor is sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce is sufficient. Dissenting, Paez argues that precedent does not control post-Lopez, because the connection to interstate commerce for possession by a felon is too attenuated. Section 931 requires no showing by the government that body armor involved a commercial transaction, substantially affected interstate travel, a crime, or possession of a firearm. There must be some connection, otherwise, as Paez argues here, mere intrastate possession of body armor by a felon not part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme and not connected to crime that affects interstate commerce, provides an insufficient commerce clause basis. The deficiency requires reversal.
Congress criminalized the possession of body armor by "violent felons." See 18 USC § 931. Within which of Supreme Court's three categories of federal Commerce Clause power does this statute fall?
Trick question -- turns out that the body armor statute is authorized by that that elusive "fourth" category of Commerce Clause power, explains the Ninth in a disappointing decision (sparking a powerful Paez dissent). United States v. Alderman, __ F.3d __, 2009 WL 1298056 (May 12, 2009), decision available here.
But then again, I'm officially nutzzzzzz, until certified un-nutzzzzzz in a competent court of the law. So I am waiting on the law, and the certificate required by the law.
But I'm no expert.(.pdf) Anyone see ours, yet? He has our certificate required by the law and I need it to be officially un-nutzzzzzz. And that's a fact!
"It
is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should.
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because
it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it
by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties,
a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before
us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction,
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur
which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can
do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously perform our
duty."
In a similar case to the case above, a guy named Marks filed several pretrial motions in which he moved to dismiss the case against him
for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The court
denied the motions without a hearing, just as above.Here is why the courts [judges] ignored the [jurisdiction] challenge in the above cases, spanning a period of at least twenty years that we now know of, in America.
The MARKS court said:
"Marks argues that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the prosecution and lacked personal jurisdiction
over him because the government failed to meet its burden
of establishing jurisdiction once Marks challenged it."
Just as in the case above:
"Marks also argue[d] that the district court committed reversible
error because it summarily denied Marks’ challenges to the
court’s jurisdiction without holding a hearing."
A DISCUSSION OF A BURDEN:
The
burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party
invoking federal jurisdiction. See Daimler Chrysler v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d
1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000). That means the government actors.
OKAY, SO LETS SEE SOME BURDEN, SHALL WE?
"We review de novo a district court’s assumption of jurisdiction.
United States v. Bennett, 147 F.3d 912, 913 (9th Cir.
1998); see United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 666 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“Jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo[.]”).
WOW, A "REVIEW DE NOVO," THAT HARDLY SEEMS A BURDEN, YET.
"We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision
whether to hold a hearing on a motion. See United States
v. Hernandez, 424 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) (motion
to suppress); United States v. Bussel, 414 F.3d 1048, 1054
(9th Cir. 2005) (motion for a new trial); United States v.
Smith, 282 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (motion to substitute
counsel); United States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1065
(9th Cir. 1998) (motion to dismiss indictment)."
AGAIN, THAT HARDLY SEEMS A BURDEN, YET. LOTS OF REVIEWING, BUT NOT MUCH BURDEN.
HERE IS HOW THE COURT IN THE MARKS CASE MET IT"S "BURDEN":
[t]he district court had personal jurisdiction
over Marks "by virtue" of Marks’ having been brought
before it on a federal indictment charging a violation of federal
law. See United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1326
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655, 659-70 (1992)); see also United States v. Lussier,
929 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1991)
(“It is well settled that
a district court has personal jurisdiction over any party who
appears before it, regardless of how his appearance was
obtained.”); United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684 n.8
(9th Cir. 1980) (same).[12] Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by not holding a hearing on Marks’ motions contesting the
court’s jurisdiction. Marks’ jurisdictional challenges were frivolous.
IMAGINE THAT:
YOU DON'T HAVE TO MEET ANY BURDEN OR HOLD ANY HEARING, AND YOU GET TO DISMISS IT WITHOUT ANSWERING THE CHALLENGE, BY NOT MEETING IT OR RECOGNIZING IT.
HARDLY SEEM LIKE MUCH OF A BURDEN TO ME. OR DUE PROCESS TO REDRESS ONE'S GRIEVANCES. BUT I'M NO EXPERT.
LOGIC FOLLOWS THAT ONCE YOU ARE IN THEIR POSSESSION AS THEIR PROPERTY AND SLAVE, YOU CAN'T CHALLENGE THE LAW(S) BEING IMPOSED AND BEING USED TO SUBJECT YOU TO SLAVERY.
ARMED WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE, AMERICA, YOU NOW KNOW THAT THE ONLY DUE PROCESS THE LAW ALLOWS TO CHALLENGE THEIR (NOT YOUR) JURISDICTION, IS AT THE POINT OF A GUN.
We live in oppressive times. We have, as a nation, become our own thought police; but instead of calling the process by which we limit our expression of dissent and wonder "censorship," we call it "concern for commercial viability."
Congress criminalized the possession of body armor by "violent felons." See 18 USC § 931. Within which of Supreme Court's three categories of federal Commerce Clause power does this statute fall?
