The Supreme Court has long recognized the "nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975).

"[A]lthough [a defendant]may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Id. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, even a conditional waiver of counsel can be unequivocal. United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A conditional waiver can be stated unequivocally, as for example when a defendant says in substance: ‘If I do not get new [unconflicted] counsel, I want to represent myself.’ There is a condition, but the demand is unequivocal.”).

Faretta no doubt says...

"Only one tribunal ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was the Star Chamber."-U.S. v Faretta , 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

OUTSIDE, IT'S AMERICA

REASONABLE DOUBT

"Silence in the face of evil is itself evil: God will not hold us guiltless.
Not to speak is to speak. Not to act is to act." ― Dietrich Bonhoeffer

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A motion under Faretta– must be "unequivocal."

Held: “We hold that while a defendant may invoke his or her self-representation rights after a denial of a motion to substitute counsel, the invocation must be unequivocal.

Unequivocal

• admitting of no doubt or misunderstanding; having only one meaning or interpretation and leading to only one conclusion; "unequivocal evidence ...

• definitive: clearly defined or formulated; "the plain and unequivocal language of the laws"- R.B.Taney
  wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

ENTER THE ATTORNEYS:

"This is a confusing and fuzzy area of law."

A defendant can place conditions on self-representation and still make an unequivocal demand: e.g., “If I do not get new counsel, I want to represent myself.” Id.

But, if the defendant states, “If I am appointed standby counsel, I would like to represent myself,” then he has made an equivocal demand and Faretta isn't triggered. Id. (?!?) {As intuitive as “conditions precedent” in Property law.}

The absurdity of this area of law is that these are usually indigent, uneducated clients who are struggling to speak to the court – often through a translator.

Deciding Faretta on phrase placement by an inarticulate defendant is, essentially, a quiet way of avoiding the train wreck of self-representation: not a bad thing from a corporate policy perspective in a commercial business, but a tough rule to understand.

How to Use: Those who represent indigent defendants in federal court will wince in recognition at the Mendez-Sanchez fact pattern. In addition to its primary holding on Faretta invocation, the decision also has an interesting and lengthy discussion on the frequently-misunderstood (by clients) “right” to new counsel.

1. the timeliness of the motion,

2. the adequacy of the court's inquiry, and

3. whether the conflict was so great “as to result in a complete break-down in communication and consequent inability to present a defense.”

Id. at *4.

Suspicion that viewpoint discrimination is afoot is at its zenith when the speech restricted is speech critical of the government," Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 86 (1st Cir. 2004)

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