The objective (snicker) reasonableness standard. A.K.A. 18 USC 875(c)

 

A.K.A. The Case Of The F.B.I. broke The Law, Again, By 'Intentionally conveying false or misleading information."

 

And it is a pretty good bet that that is probabbly not the first time they did that to you, America. Read all about it! That's because words don't matter anymore. Might makes right only.

 

In the original Watts decision, in the Watts Supreme Court Case, the judges used quotation marks around the word ”threat,” when attempting to define a [true] threat.

"The majority below seemed to agree. Perhaps this interpretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it. See the dissenting opinion below, 131 U.S. App. D.C., at 135-142, 402 F.2d, at 686-693 (Wright, J.). But whatever the "willfullness" requirement implies, the statute initially requires the Government to prove a true "threat.""WATTS v. UNITED STATES, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)

Okay readers, so please tell me who moved the quotation to the left? And why? What was their "true" intent. And why were they not held to be "required" to prove in my case?

This case emphasizes the "fundamental assumptions" and "personal predilections" of certain trial court judges as to what is a true "threat." Note I did not say a "true threat" but, a true "threat." Tell me, who moved the quotation left?

Since no one has ever been able to define “absolute true” in the history of the world, except Jesus, this makes me wonder who really is the Omnipotent One, God, or someone within the government, playing God?

NEW FOR 2011!! ASK "SPECIAL" AGENT JEFFREY CUGNO A QUESTION!!

Q: Agent Cugno, what is the duty of government regarding a threat to itself?

"It is the first and highest duty of a Government to protect its governmental agencies, in the performance of their public services, from threats of violence, which would tend to coerce them or restrain them in the performance of their duties."

"Therefore, the government can protect [AND ATTACK] what itself creates and created.

It has no duty or authority to protect [and serve] an individual unrelated to its agency, performing no public service on its behalf."

Q: Agent Cugno, is that "true?"

"Actually it was a mistake."

 

Objective File 1038(a)

an objective reasonableness standard, A.K.A. The reasonable Listening interpretation, A.K.A. Subject the speaker To False arrest For Speech! With no subponas or Experts! or Proof!

"We conclude that § 1038(a)(1) contains no
such specific intent element,..."

The district court rejected Castagana’s interpretation of the statute and, with regard to the element of intent, instructed the jury only that, to convict, they must find that Castagana “intentionally conveyed false or misleading information.”

It refers, as we have said, to “conduct with intent to convey false or misleading information under circumstances where such information may reasonably be believed and where such information indicates that [terrorist] activity has taken, is taking, or will take place.” 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Instead of including these specific terms of art in § 1038(a), Congress crafted this statute using the language “under circumstances where” and “may reasonably be believed.” 18 U.S.C. § 1038(a)(1). This is a noticeable difference, and we have read statutes with language similar to § 1038(a)(1) as containing an objective reasonableness standard. See Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that the crime of “knowingly and willfully” threatening the President required only that the threat be made under circumstances where “a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be "interpreted by those to whom” it is addressed as a serious threat and not be the result of mistake, duress or coercion); see also United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying objective reasonableness standard to presidential threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 871, and re-affirming Roy).

WOW, ARE ALL AMERICANS NOW PRESIDENTIAL?

 

See United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that an "intent to threaten" requires "a showing of specific intent"); United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2000)