6th Amendment of the Constitution

Amendment VI

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Guarantee Of Adequate Notice.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to be clearly informed of the nature and cause of the charges in order to permit adequate preparation of a defense. See Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1990).

A murder trial is not one of the "games that people play." The due process clause does not serve as an innocent bystander. It acts as the umpire and referee all rolled into one and calls "foul" where rules of fair play are broken. As Justice Scalia noted, paraphrasing the felicitous expression of Justice Holmes seventy years earlier, due process requires the government to "turn square corners." Society is obliged to prosecute those who break its rules, but society may not break its own rules in the prosecution process.

In Gaudin, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the long-standing rule that juries have the constitutional duty to decide mixed questions of law and fact, 115 S. Ct. at 2314, and held that whether a matter is material is such a mixed question. Id. at 2320.

The U.S. Constitution regulates the division of labor between judge and jury. The Sixth Amendment guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." The U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, "[t]he Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is charged." United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2320 (1995); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080 (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Some say while the jury is the arbiter of the facts, the judge is the arbiter of the law: but why must "the judge must be permitted to instruct the jury on the law and insist that the jury follow his instructions." Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2315 (citing Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06 (1895)). This leads to unlawful jury instructions. The key point is to force counsel on the accused, unlawful jury instructions can then take place, inter alia. But the key is the forcing. After that is done, unlawful words on a piece of paper will be the least of one's concerns.