Title 18: 875(c), as presently drafted, applies to pure speech; it
imposes a criminal penalty of up to 5 years of imprisonment,
plus a fine, for the mere utterance or writing of what is, or
may be perceived as, a true statement of fact—without anything
more. 875(c) is so broadly drafted, the government is not required 
to prove anything before the district court.

Neither the government or I  dispute that the Act “seek[s] to 
regulate ‘only . . . words.’ ” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 612 (1973) (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972)).

875(c) therefore concerns me because of its potential for
setting a precedent whereby the government may proscribe
speech solely because it is called true, While lies go free. 

This rule the government would urge you to apply in
order to uphold 875(c) would, if left unchecked, significantly
enlarge the scope of existing categorical exceptions to First
Amendment protection. All previous circumstances in which
speech has been found proscribable involve not just speech, 
but additional elements that serve to narrow what
speech may be punished, like time and place and manner.
Indeed, 875(c) is unconstitutional in that it's nature is 
selective, in that only the government can say if it is true. 
Like saying you are a witch. You are then left to prove otherwise.

The sad fact is, governments become corrupted, and power over 
speech is the most dangerous to give Congress. Which is why it
was forbidden and placed off bounds under the very First
Amendmet under the Bill of Rights. Perhaps, in context, many of these
threats are within the local government’s legitimate reach. But the
Federal government cannot decide that some speech may not be said
without a reviewing court’s undertaking a thoughtful analysis
of the constitutional concerns raised by such government
interference with speech.

Finding no appropriate way to avoid the First Amendment
question I pose, I hold that the speech proscribed by
875(c) is not sufficiently confined to fit among any
categories of speech previously held to be beyond the
First Amendment’s protective sweep. I apply strict
scrutiny review to 875(c), and hold it unconstitutional
because it is not narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling
Federal governmental interest, it is vague and overbroad, 
and because No means No.